

WAR OR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: THE LIGHT FORCE LEADER'S TRAINING DILEMMA

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
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Infantry**



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ABSTRACT

War or Operations Other Than War: The Light Forces Leader's Training Dilemma by Major Christopher J. Rizzo, USA, 64 pages.

Since the end of the Cold War, the world security environment has been characterized by ethnic and regional turbulence. Consequently, the number and frequency of operations other than war (OOTW) requiring the deployment of the U.S. Army have increased. The majority of these OOTW missions have been conducted by light force units. Light force U.S. Army units are defined as airborne and light infantry units. With the advent of these operations, a debate has arisen over whether light forces should train on OOTW tasks. Many military officers argue that units trained for war can quickly adapt to OOTW. While other soldiers and leaders believe that OOTW requires unique considerations which war fighting training alone does not provide. This monograph examines whether current training conducted by light forces prepares soldiers for the full spectrum of conflict.

The monograph examines selected light forces operations over the last thirty years to demonstrate operational patterns. The historical survey includes operations in the Dominican Republic from 1965-66, in Grenada during 1983, in Panama from 1989-90, in Somalia from 1992-94, and in Haiti during 1995. The historical examples confirm that these operations oscillate between traditional combat and OOTW and they provide data for analysis to determine if their training adequately prepared units for operations in fluid environments. Examination of these actions includes comparisons between the unit's war fighting training, the actual tactics the units used to accomplish their mission, and the changes to their normal training in preparation for or during the operations. The monograph then examines infantry training manuals to determine whether the tasks, conditions, and standards are appropriate for preparing light forces for these OOTW environments. The mission essential tasks list for light forces are analyzed to determine current training focus.

The monograph concludes that the Army's separation of OOTW tasks from their war fighting doctrine fails to capture the fluid environments of historical operations. The historical shift from combat to stability operations, or vice a versa, often frustrates soldiers and finds their leaders unprepared. The monograph recommends the inclusion of OOTW tasks into training manuals so light forces can develop training plans which prepare soldiers for both combat and OOTW tasks.

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
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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction	1
II. Historical Use of Light Forces	6
A. Operation Power Pack	6
B. Operation Urgent Fury	11
C. Operations in Panama	15
D. Operations in Somalia	22
E. Operations in Haiti	29
III. Comparison and Analysis of Light Forces Training Doctrine with Historical and Future Employments	35
IV. Conclusions	41
Appendix 1 FM 100-5, Operations, OOTW Activities	47
Appendix 2 Current and Past Light Forces Battalion METLs	48
Endnotes	51
Selected Bibliography	59

*"The Army training mission is to prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to deploy, fight, and win in combat at any intensity level, anywhere, anytime."*¹

General Carl E. Vuono

I. Introduction

On 30 December 1992, less than three weeks after arriving in Somalia, the battalion S-3 for 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry from the 10th Mountain Division soon learned he was unprepared for the dilemmas of current military operations. While working on an upcoming company air-assault mission with his battalion commander, a report came into the battalion tactical operations center that a nearby International Red Cross food storage warehouse was being looted by locals. The battalion commander quickly dispatched his S-3 with a small contingent to quail the looting. Without any nonlethal means to bring the chaos under control, the S-3 ordered his soldiers to charge the looters with fixed bayonets while screaming at the tops of their lungs. After gaining control of the situation, the crowd once again became very unruling. Seeing the increased danger his soldiers were in, the S-3 pulled an instigator from the crowd with plans to shoot him in order to convince the crowd to cease their aggressive behavior. Before the atrocity was committed, a reinforcing unit arrived to assist in controlling the problem.² Shooting an instigator is clearly not the proper method of handling a hostile crowd. To have done so, the S-3's actions would have indicated a total lack of respect for human life. Paradoxically, his purpose in Somalia was to save and relieve human suffering. It appears from his planned action that the major was not prepared for such an ambiguous situation. These challenging military operations are becoming more common in today's Army.

Operations other than war, OOTW, is the current label that the Army uses for these precarious operations. OOTW activities range from operations that involve armed conflict to peacekeeping (See Appendix 1). In this monograph, OOTW activities will be referred to as non-traditional operations. Combat leaders and soldiers often find these operations difficult to understand and perform in. With the end of the Cold War and the increase military involvement in OOTW operations, a debate on whether to address OOTW tasks in training is quickly becoming an issue.

The military professionals that argue against training specifically for OOTW point to the similarity between traditional combat tasks and OOTW tasks. Some of these professionals argue that when a battalion conducts a peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operations, the squads and platoons conduct tasks that are identical to their traditional combat missions.³ To provide credence to this argument, a report on peacekeeping operations published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) listed eighteen critical individual skills necessary for peacekeeping. Twelve of the eighteen tasks were identical to conventional tasks found in current training manuals.⁴ These twelve tasks are basic to any infantry unit. Finding these similarities, opponents of specialized OOTW training profess units prepared for war can easily adapt to OOTW. They further argue that disciplined soldiers and intelligent, flexible leaders can overcome the minor differences between traditional wartime tasks and those specific to OOTW. Other soldiers and leaders believe that although the wartime and OOTW tasks appear similar in name, the environment in which these tasks are performed require restraint and forethought.⁵

The arguments for specialized training focused on OOTW are based on the belief that OOTW is fundamentally different from conventional combat. Proponents for specialized OOTW training point out that the purpose of traditional infantry tasks are to kill and destroy enemy forces without regard to their surroundings.⁶ In the OOTW environment, forces must prevent collateral damage and minimize casualties. These advocates of OOTW training profess that forces designated and trained solely for war fighting require a change in mind set and attitudes prior to conducting a OOTW mission. A recent Department of Defense Inspector General report supported this argument by concluding, "combat skills, proficiency, and discipline are fundamental for success in peace operations, but those qualities alone are insufficient to ensure adequate preparation for such operations."⁷ In emphasizing the difference between conventional and OOTW tasks, other military professionals advocate that OOTW requires specialized weapons, tactics and training.⁸ Both parties of the controversy point to Army doctrine and recent history as proof of their arguments.

Arguably, the Army is experiencing a paradigm shift. The days of the large conventional war scenarios, typified by the Cold War era, in which the Army's primary concern was to determine a method to defeat a Warsaw Pact attack into Western Europe, is now a distant memory. In May of 1993, President William Clinton, in speaking to the US Military Academy graduating class at West Point, said, "You will be called upon in many ways in this new era to keep the peace, to relieve suffering, to help teach officers from new democracies in the ways of a democratic army, and still ... win our wars."⁹ Realizing that the post Cold-War environment was causing international security changes, the Army's primary doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, Operations, added versatility as the fifth

tenet of Army operations.¹⁰ Versatility is the ability of units to adapt to different missions and tasks.¹¹ To provide some focus on this concept of versatility, Chapter 13, Operations Other Than War was added to FM 100-5.

Operations other than war are classified as those activities occurring during conflict and peacetime. OOTW activities range from nation assistance to attacks and raids. War, on the other hand, involves the use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy. FM 100-5 warns that the states of war, conflict and peace could all exist in any particular theater.¹² With such a broad concept of the Army's operating environment, versatility becomes apparent as an Army operating tenet. For units that are poised to deploy in eighteen hours, the concept of versatility, which require they operate successfully in all three environments, can be a training requirement nightmare.

The Army's rapid deployment force consist primary of light and airborne infantry units.¹³ This monograph refers to light forces as light and airborne infantry units. These light forces lack heavy equipment, such as large quantities of tracked vehicles, which allows them to rapidly deploy from their bases in the US to anywhere in the world. The rapid deployability of light forces limits their time to prepare exclusively for OOTW missions. Conversely, the fluid environment mentioned in FM 100-5 can place a strain on leaders and soldiers who exclusively train in the traditional combat environment.

The fundamental question this monograph attempts to answer is: Does current light forces training prepare these units for successful force projection across the full range of military operations? To examine this question, the monograph surveys the historical use of light forces over the past thirty years, compares and analyzes the operational use of

light forces with current light forces training doctrine, offers some conclusions, and finally provides recommendations.

*"On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element's natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political objective will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character."*¹⁴

Carl von Clausewitz

II. Historical Use of Light Forces

This section of the monograph examines the historical use of light forces in order to establish some common understanding of the environments in which light forces are expected to perform. The historical examination of light forces covers operations in the Dominican Republic from 1965-1966, Grenada in 1983, Panama from 1989-1990, Somalia from 1993-1994, and Haiti in 1995 in order to demonstrate how long these light forces have operated in OOTW environments. The historical examples exemplify the obviously difficult situations that these soldiers and leaders encountered.

A. Operation Power Pack

On the evening of 29 April 1965, US Army troops from the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division deployed from Pope Air Force Base to intervene in the Dominican Republic civil war. Originally alerted on the 26th, the soldiers had no idea what they would be specifically required to do. Throughout the preparation phase of the deployment, soldiers were purposely denied deployment information because of the classified nature of the operation. The plan called for the men to be briefed during a scheduled stopover at Ramsey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico. Prior to departing, soldiers talked of "killing commies"¹⁵ and "kicking Red asses."¹⁶ Information soldiers received

about the situation in the Dominican Republic came from radio, television, newspapers, and rumors.¹⁷ The US intervention was designed to prevent a communist takeover of the Dominican Republic.

At Ramsey, the paratroopers were to be briefed on a planned airdrop near San Isidro where they were to seize and secure the airfield, expand the airhead westward to the Duarte Bridge, and stand ready to assist in the evacuation of American personnel. Two hours into the flight, Major General Robert York, the 82nd Airborne Division Commander was informed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, to airland his forces on the assumption that the airfield was in friendly hands. At 0215hrs on 30 April, the first aircraft landed carrying soldiers who's ammunition was still palletized.¹⁸ The assumption that friendly troops controlled the airfield led to a decision not to issue any ordnance while the paratroopers were airborne. This assumption was based on Vice Admiral Kleber Masterson's personal reconnaissance which speculated that armed rebel bands would not be roaming the area. Although Masterson's assumption was correct, it was not until dawn that the soldiers were ready to commence operations. The unprepared paratroopers were in a precarious situation.¹⁹

After 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry secured the airfield, the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry, together with the cavalry troop and engineer attachments, moved west to secure the Duarte Bridge. The bridge crossed the Izama River and led to the US Marine held US Embassy. Not knowing which forces were friendly and with instructions to fire only when fired upon, paratroopers were required to conduct house-to-house searches in order to secure and expand the eastern side of the bridgehead. Securing the bridgehead would later facilitate the link up with marine forces securing the US embassy. Once the eastern

side of the Duarte Bridge was secured, the paratroopers were ordered to clear a six block radius on the west bank. The operation required an infantry company to seize a vital rebel-held power plant. The company was required to use close range fires and hand grenades to secure the power plant.²⁰ The operation that day cost the infantry battalion five casualties. In a twenty four hour period, the battalion found themselves using lethal and nonlethal means to accomplish their mission.²¹

During the night of 2nd/3rd May, the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd, recently arrived in country, departed from the Duarte bridgehead to conduct a link-up with marine forces in order to establish a line of communication (LOC). Militarily, the LOC had trapped 80 percent of the rebel forces in Ciudad Nueva. With the Caribbean Sea to their south, the Izama River to their east, the marine secured International Security Zone to their west, and the LOC to their north, the rebels had no place to run. With the rebels partially contained, Ambassador William Bennett had the paratroopers begin a series of humanitarian acts that included providing food, water, and medical supplies to relieve the suffering of the civil war torn residents of Santo Domingo. Up to this point, the overall military plan on how to resolve the conflict was still being formulated by President Lyndon Johnson, Ambassador Bennett, and General Bruce Palmer, the land forces commander. Yet, until political negotiations proved fruitful, US soldiers would remain in harm's way, the targets of sniper bullets, machine-gun fire, and depending on one's location, popular resentment and mob violence. For over two days, soldiers conducted operations in the Dominican Republic not completely understanding their purpose because an overall briefing on the operation was never provided.²²

Soon after the LOC was secured, soldiers received copies of President Johnson's 2 May speech to the nation justifying the US intervention.²³ The military objectives were to protect or evacuate foreign nationals, initiate humanitarian programs, help restore order, and prevent a Communist victory.²⁴ Yet, throughout the operation, the paratroopers actions were governed by a plethora of politically and militarily motivated directives, guidelines, and rules of engagements (ROE). Confusing the situation even further, the ROEs were given piecemeal in response to specific situations. At the beginning of the operation, soldiers could not initiate fire and could only return fire in self-defense. As the operation progressed, the ROE was expanded to allow fire and maneuver only when a positions was in danger of being overrun. Toward the end of the intervention, if the fire and maneuver ceased the threat, the troops were to return to their original position.²⁵ At no time was a statement of clear ROE briefed to the paratroopers.²⁶ With this constantly changing ROE, how and when to act became very confusing to many paratroopers.

In the midst of this confusion, the 82nd was to appear neutral in its actions. Their activities in and around Santo Domingo included establishing and conducting check points, manning and securing key facilities, conducting security patrols, and securing humanitarian efforts. In an effort to get each infantry battalion familiar with each specific mission and combat initiated, MG Robert York had these units rotate by conducting a relief-in-place, defense of a river line, and operations in built up areas.²⁷ Without much intelligence on the rebel force, paratroopers many times began operations never knowing the threat in which they faced. Although a cease-fire was arranged as early as 30 April, both factions violated it at will. Paratroopers simply treated those who shot at them as the

enemy and those who did not as friends. Since many of the rebels would wear the same uniforms as the friendlies, this logic seemed irrefutable.²⁸

Patrolling in Santo Domingo was “very, very frightening” said one company commander.²⁹ Even when soldiers executed patrolling procedures flawlessly, they were still exposed to enemy countermeasures. True protection from sniper fire was a luxury. Few walls or houses could stop even small-arms rounds, and ricochets off pavements or within doorways often could do more damage than a direct hit. Snipers were found everywhere from rooftops to sewers.³⁰ One paratrooper described Santo Domingo as being “just like Dodge City.”³¹ Another exasperated soldier said, “You’re giving food out one minute, ducking sniper fire the next, fighting to reopen the corridor the next, then water distribution, then more fighting, and all of a sudden you’re calling ‘Cease-fire! Cease-fire! Those are our guys!’”³² In late May, the ROE changed from “return fire when fired upon” to “take cover and not fire unless the position was in danger of being overrun or American lives were in extreme danger.”³³ This change was politically motivated and stemmed from the US wanting to maintain its neutrality. After returning from the Dominican Republic, one paratrooper wrote, “Most of us were beginning to experience a new phenomena - the political control of military operations ... Here again was a condition for which we were not properly trained.”³⁴ If it were not for the paratroopers flexibility to the changing ROE and adaptability to the varying environments, success would have been difficult to achieve. Although successful, these men had never been exposed to such a confusing environment.

Operation Power Pack, although successful, was marred by uncertainty. First, the troops of 82nd were deployed without receiving a pre-deployment briefing explaining their

purpose. Copies from the President's speech to the nation was used to provide early direction for their actions. Second, paratroopers off loading aircraft with ammunition still palletized, in the midst of an ongoing civil war, points to the abrupt changes in the deployment plan. Placing soldiers in harm's way without self-protection measures was clearly a lack of contingency planning on behalf of the division leadership. Third, the lack of information of threat capabilities is often an aspect of rapid deployment missions and certainly added to the fog of the operation. Finally, the stringent ROE imposed by Washington made little sense to the soldiers and caused undue casualties. Soldiers cursed these restrictions and often wondered why the Army had not trained them better for such politically sensitive operations.³⁵ Nearly twenty years later, the 82nd Airborne Division would find themselves operating on another Caribbean island. This time the ROE would not be so restrictive.

B. Operation Urgent Fury

For the paratroopers of the 82nd, Operation Urgent Fury was another operation begun with meager information on the enemy, the terrain, and even on their own role and objectives. This lack of information can be attributed to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, CINCLANT, Admiral Wesley McDonald who assigned Admiral Joseph Metcalf, Commander of the 2nd Fleet as the Joint Task Force commander. The 2nd Fleet staff was neither accustomed to nor prepared to coordinate the invasion. The XVIII Corps at Ft. Bragg, had an "on the shelf" plan of the invasion but it was not used or consulted.³⁶

Operation Urgent Fury was the US intervention of the island of Grenada, where three weeks earlier a coup had taken place. In President Ronald Reagan's announcement

of the invasion, he listed the three US objectives: 1) to protect our citizens, 2) to facilitate the evacuation of those who wanted to leave, and 3) to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada.³⁷ Grenada is the southern most island on a long chain of islands that extends four hundred miles east of Puerto Rico to the coast of Venezuela.

The concept of the operation called for the island to be divided in half, where the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit, MEU, responsible for the north, and the Army Ranger/Joint Special Operations Task Force, JSOTF, responsible for the south. The Airborne task force was to relieve these ranger units at Point Salines, neutralize any remaining resistance, and conduct the non-combatant evacuation operations. Later, a Caribbean peacekeeping force would take over after the US forces had redeployed.³⁸

At 2100 hours on 24 Oct 1983, Task Force 2-325, the DRF 1 of the 82nd at the time, was called out for an emergency deployment readiness exercise, EDRE.³⁹ The battalion commander, LTC Jack Hamilton, was briefed on the possible invasion plans two days prior to the actual deployment date. On the morning of the 24th, changes to the original plan were already being briefed at the division operations center. Given the rapid changes in the original plan, Hamilton's S-3, Major Bill Baine, began to develop operational packets for key leaders in the battalion that day. These packets, consisting of tourist maps, imagery of the objectives, and a simple operations order numbering assembly areas and objectives, were tremendously helpful in conducting the operation.⁴⁰

On 25 October, Task Force 2-325 airlanded at Point Salines at approximately 1630 hours and by 2000 hours had completely relieved the rangers on the airfield. This initial operation was continually hampered by sporadic fire fights and the surrender of over 200 Cubans along with hundreds of refugees. LTC Hamilton later admitted not anticipating

the abundant surrenders and refugee problem. Because much of the high ground that surrounded the airfield was within small arms range and still occupied by enemy forces, LTC Hamilton planned for a predawn attack of a Cuban compound at Calliste, northeast of the airfield.⁴¹

The attack began with one company laying down a base of fire while the other company maneuvered to secure the compound. After 2-325 IN received stiff resistance, close air support from A-7s was required to support the attack. After several passes, the Cubans surrendered. The task force had found 16 Cuban KIAs, 29 WIAs, and 86 POWs. Friendly casualties were 2 KIAs and 10 WIAs, with one of the KIAs being a company commander. By late that afternoon, the task force had reached the small town of Frequente, just east of Calliste where they formed a linear defense with 3-325 IN. By early that evening, the defense was established, and for the first time in 63 hours, the soldiers were able to get some sporadic sleep.⁴²

The leaders were not so fortunate. At midnight on 27 October, the task force was ordered to attack at 0630 hours the next morning to begin securing the area around the Grand Anse Beach and to clear the area between Point Salines to Saint Georges. The leaders began to plan what amounted to a massive reconnaissance in force that would take several days to accomplish. To complicate matters in this operation, local Grenadians began looting, causing the task force to set up population control points and extensive house-to-house searches to locate and apprehend members of the PRA and other suppressive individuals. By the fourth day, 29 October, the brigade headquarters had announced that the operation was in the "pacification" phase.⁴³

Yet, on the very next day, 2-325 IN was tasked to conduct an air assault to secure the Cuban Unconventional Warfare Camp on the top of Grand Etang, the highest mountain on the island. With the support of Cobra gunships, Naval air, A/C 130 gunships, and artillery, the task force found that the camp was deserted and had been abandoned for some time. After capturing numerous weapons and documentation, an aid station was established to treat about 300 Grenadians in the nearby village of Birch Grove. This humanitarian effort was designed to relieve the suffering that occurred as a result of the coup and to build good will among the Grenadines. By day eight, 2 November, at 1100 hours, hostilities were declared officially ended. On the morning of 4 November, the task force returned to Ft. Bragg.⁴⁴

For this DRF unit, and others like them in the 82nd, Urgent Fury was a difficult and complex operation. Soldiers were required to transition from a combat phase to a pacification and police phase. In less than a ten-day period, paratroopers were engaged in fierce fire-fights where they witnessed leaders and comrades killed and wounded, conducted extensive house-to-house searches, secured key facilities, provided food and medical support, and finally established law and order. To be able to engage an armed enemy one minute while consistently maintaining a humane demeanor in dealing with POWs, refugees, and civilians the next, exemplified the professionalism and maturity of these soldiers.

Unlike Operation Power Pack, Urgent Fury allowed soldiers to aggressively pursue the enemy. Yet, this freedom did not come without criticism. A Cuban officer commented, "The US troops have a lot of training and very good support in terms of hardware, but their morale is based on might alone... Their tactic is to destroy everything

with their planes and artillery first and see what's left."⁴⁵ The extensive use of the Spectre gunships, A-7s, and naval gunfire into areas with many private homes where enemy sniper positions were suspected caused much undue damage and suffering for not only Grenadians but US service men as well. In one friendly fire incident, an A-7 had strafed the second brigade TOC killing one US paratrooper.⁴⁶ In a case of inappropriate use of force, an A-7 bombing directed at a sniper in a mental hospital caused seventeen dead civilians.⁴⁷ In such operations, the use of force needs to be closely scrutinized. Six years later, operations in Panama would reveal the return to more restrictive ROE.

C. Operations in Panama

The deployment of light forces to Panama began eight months prior to Operation Just Cause. On 7 May 1989, during the presidential elections in Panama, General Manuel Noriega, whose army ran the election process, expected to defeat the opposition party. To Noriega's surprise, he was defeated by the Guillermo Endara, the opposition party leader. As a result of his defeat, Noriega declared the elections void and used his newly formed Dignity Battalions to physically beat and embarrass the opposition party leaders in the streets of Panama City.⁴⁸

In response to the Noriega's actions and the growing hostilities of his military forces toward Americans in Panama, President George Bush ordered the deployment of over 1,800 troops from the United States to Panama to protect the lives and property of US servicemen and civilians. The operation was designated Operation Nimrod Dancer. Included in the deployment forces was a brigade of light infantrymen from the 7th Infantry Division from Ft. Ord, California. This force consisted of a brigade headquarters, an

infantry battalion, and a field artillery battery. These light infantrymen were tasked to protect US lives and property in the northern towns of Coco Solo and Ft. Espinar.

Initially, these forces fulfilled their mission by conducting security patrols in full combat loads through the US housing areas and facilities. Later in the summer, General Marc Cisneros, the USARSO commander, initiated what were to be called Sand Flea operations to further establish US presence in Panama. These exercises were designed to exercise the freedom of maneuver rights of US forces under the 1980 Panama Canal treaties. Sand Flea operations allowed the Southern Command to judge PDF reaction plans and to establish moral ascendancy over them by showing the PDF that the US was willing to stand up to their inhumane behavior.⁴⁹ Yet, these operations were not without risk.

Many Sand Flea operations saw US soldiers in direct confrontation with the PDF over whether the US soldiers had the right to move close to many PDF installations. Although all of these confrontations ended peacefully, the fact the both sides held loaded weapons lent itself to a possible blood letting. In all these situations, however, soldiers exercised extreme caution and good judgment.⁵⁰

Following the shooting death of a Marine lieutenant and the detention and assault of a Navy lieutenant and his wife in Panama City on the night of 16 December, the National Command Authority ordered the execution of Operation Just Cause. H-hour was set for 0100 hours on 20 December 1989. The operations objectives were to:

1. Protect US Lives and property.
2. Capture and deliver Noriega to the proper authorities.

3. Neutralize the PDF.
4. Support the establishment of a US reorganized government in Panama.
5. Restructure the PDF.⁵¹

In addition to the security forces deployed to Panama to conduct Operation Nimrod Dancer and the infantry brigade permanently stationed in Panama, two brigades from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 75th Ranger Regiment conducted the assaults against the PDF. In two days US forces in Panama neutralized all PDF resistance. On 3 January 1990, Noriega surrendered to US forces from the Vatican Embassy where he was taken into custody by the US Drug Enforcement Agency.⁵² Although it was presented to the public as a resounding success, Operation Just Cause was filled with lessons for light forces operations and training. An analysis of these lessons begins with an examination of the environment in which these light forces were required to operate.

The primary threat to US soldiers in the first days of the operation was the PDF. The PDF were a uniformed, professional military force scattered across Panama in small company and battalion sized compounds. Identification and engagement of the PDF while in their compounds was not a significant problem in the early days of the operation. Many of the compounds were in the midst of civilian communities which made the operation difficult.

At 0045 hours on 20 December, soldiers from 2d platoon, C company, 4th Battalion 17th Infantry, who were apart of the security force already deployed in-country at Coco Solo, were required to assault through a garment factory that housed a Chinese family in order to neutralize the Naval Infantry Company Headquarters. Across the street, a platoon from the 3/504 IN, that was attached to C company, had to evacuate a US

housing area before establishing its support position for 2nd platoon.⁵³ In entering the three story building, the soldiers of 2nd platoon were confronted with Chinese men and women screaming and running about. The platoon leader, Lieutenant Dan Kirk, immediately had the entire Chinese family gathered up and placed in one room while the rest of the platoon cleared the building. Once the Chinese family was under control and the rest of the building cleared, the platoon prepared to breach a metal door that was connected to the third floor of the Naval Infantry Company headquarters building. After clearing the top two floors with grenades and automatic fire, the PDF surrendered. Remarkably, not one civilian was injured.⁵⁴

Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), having deployed from Ft. Bragg only hours before Just Cause, would not have the luxury of being familiar with their targets like 4-17 IN had. Five hours after leaving Ft. Bragg in freezing rain, the paratrooper jumped into the black, hot, humid Panamanian sky in a parachute assault onto the Tocumen/Torrijos airport. Just hours later, at approximately 0700 hours, the battalion conducted an air assault into Panama La Vieja. The intent of the operation was to surround the garrison and demand a PDF surrender. Yet, as soon as the Black Hawk helicopters touched down, intense automatic weapons fire opened up from PDF soldiers in the barracks and civilian houses. At one landing zone, the paratroopers were dropped on a long, exposed stretch of mud flats which severely constrained their ability to maneuver. Despite the PDF firing, many civilians in the area extended ropes to the paratroopers to help pull them from the muck.⁵⁵

At the other landing zone, the opposite problem occurred. Eight foot elephant grass blanketed the area, causing difficulty in not only locating the source of automatic fire

but in organizing themselves for an attack. Yet, despite these problems, the battalion was able to secure the garrison. Evidence showed that the Panamanians were surprised and withdrew rather quickly. The paratroopers found a dining area in the garrison with half-eaten breakfasts still on the tables. Remarkably, many PDF soldiers still did not know the invasion had occurred and many were detained as they arrived in vehicles to go to work. The danger to the battalion continued throughout the day. Cars full of armed PDF or dignity battalion members began to drive up to the fighting positions of the paratroopers to let loose with automatic weapons fire. The battalion recorded nine such incidents where vehicles were either stopped or destroyed. Along with the drive by shooting incidents, the battalion received intermittent PDF sniper fire all day from adjacent civilian houses. Miraculously, no one was injured.⁵⁶ Before they could enjoy their success, the battalion was quickly tasked for another mission.

At about 2000 hours that night, 2-504 PIR was ordered to seize and secure the Marriott Hotel just two miles down the road. Reportedly, Panamanian forces held hostages at the hotel. Company B, with an engineer squad and the brigade surgeon, was tasked with the mission and headed down the street leading to the hotel. Along the way, B Company encountered an ambush, a drive-by shooting, and several incidents of sniper fire. Through it all, the company was able to secure the hotel and gain release of all hostages. In less than twenty-four hours, this battalion had weathered a night parachute drop, an opposed air assault, drive-by shootings, a mortar attack, and continuous sniper fire.⁵⁷ Other battalion encounters in the 82nd resembled 2-504th PIR combat.

1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 2-504 PIR's sister battalion, had a similar experience. After parachuting onto Torrijos Airport several hours after H-hour,

the battalion air assaulted into Tinajitas, the location of the PDF's 1st Infantry Company. The assault began at 0830 hours. Enroute and on final approach the helicopters received heavy ground fire. As soon as the troops hit the ground, they immediately received both direct and indirect fire. By 1430 hours, the battalion secured the PDF compound.⁵⁸ The assault cost the battalion two KIAs and seventeen WIAs.⁵⁹ Given the wintry conditions in which the unit departed Ft. Bragg, it was not surprising that six of the seventeen WIAs occurred from heat exhaustion or heat stroke. Although preparatory fires from attack helicopters, fixed-wing or artillery are normally execute prior to such an assault, the surrounding, densely populated areas at Torrajitas prevented these practices. Major General James Johnson, the 82nd Division Commander, stated, "We put our soldiers at risk in order to minimize casualties and damage to the Panamanian people and their country."⁶⁰ General Johnson could not have been more correct. Having to conduct air assaults in broad daylight with restraints not to use preparatory fires to keep the enemy pinned down, the paratroopers were clearly exposed to the dangers of not only ground fire while in the air but to direct and indirect fires while assaulting on foot.

On 22 December, the 82nd began eighteen days of stability operations in and around Panama City. Many of the PDF and Dignity Battalion personnel melted into the civilian population causing widespread looting and arson activities. In order to gain control of this havoc, the paratroopers established security around key Panamanian governmental building and civilian businesses while at the same time conducting security patrols and checkpoints. Within the first two days of stability operations in Panama City, the 82nd experienced sniper fire, drive-by shootings and hostile looting civilians. Through it all, the soldiers were constantly adapting to changing ROE. By 10 January, the division

had redeployed back to Ft. Bragg.⁶¹ Soon the 1st Brigade (9th Regiment), 7th Infantry Division would be in-country prepared to relieve elements of the 82nd.⁶²

On Christmas Day, 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry relieved elements of the 325th Infantry of the 82nd and began operations in Panama City. The battalion's mission was to safeguard key facilities, find and capture members of Noriega's dignity battalions, and restore order in the neighborhoods. To accomplish these tasks, foot patrols were conducted day and night; road blocks were placed on highways to check passengers and enforce nighttime curfews; vital facilities such as food warehouses, banks, and schools were occupied to prevent looting; guns were confiscated; and leads on wanted members of Noriega's regime were investigated. At first, the ROE permitted unlimited access to all businesses and homes. Permission to enter was always requested, but if denied, the soldiers were permitted to force their way in. After about a week, the threat lessened and the mission became more constabulary in nature. Soldiers were now conducting joint patrols with the newly formed Panamanian Public Force and expected to demonstrate their professionalism and respect for human life. Throughout the month of duty in Panama City, the ROE constantly changed in response to the various threats. Often, US soldiers lives were placed in deliberate jeopardy rather than subjecting the populace to unnecessary damage or suffering.⁶³

Operation Just Cause was a unique operation in that it provided light forces with a conglomeration of tasks under constantly changing and restrictive ROE. The close proximity of civilians in and around target areas caused changes in traditional combat practices. At one moment units were fiercely engaged in fire fights, and the next, they were acting as policemen. The operation began with the use of overwhelming force and

ended with passive presence. Through all of it, the soldier was constantly required to exercise good judgment and fire discipline. Difficult operations that required these acute skills would soon arise again. Four years later, the light infantrymen of the 10th Mountain Division would experience conflict like they had never prepared for before. Initially deployed to secure humanitarian relief efforts, the 10th soon found themselves entangled in a very complex environment.

D. Operations in Somalia

Operations began in Somalia to provide humanitarian relief for over a million starving people. The US involvement in Somalia proceeded through three stages, the first, Operation Provide Relief was a humanitarian assistance mission that ran from 15 August to 9 December 1992; the second, Operation Restore Hope combined humanitarian assistance with limited military action and lasted from 9 December 92 to 4 May 93; and the third, UNISOM II was a peace enforcement mission involving active combat and nation-building and persisted from 4 May 93 to 31 March 94.⁶⁴

For Operation Provide Relief, President George Bush activated a Joint Task Force, JTF, organized by CENTCOM to conduct the emergency airlift of food and supplies in response to a UN request for more supplies. During the six months of Provide Relief, a daily average of 20 sorties delivered approximately 150 metric tons of supplies. In total, the JTF delivered more than 28,000 metric tons of critically needed supplies by airlift.⁶⁵ Despite this huge relief effort, Somali factions would confiscate many supply convoys thereby preventing them from reaching the people who needed them most. This intervention of the relief effort spawned Operation Restore Hope.

The 10th Mountain Division provided the US ground troops in Somalia for both Operation Restore Hope and UNISOM II. During Restore Hope, the 10th Mountain Division's mission was to secure key facilities, provide security at food distribution points, as well as provide security for relief convoys.⁶⁶

Operations in Somalia presented the 10th Mountain Division with a very challenging tactical environment. The tactical situation was characterized by an ambiguous threat. Unlike in war, the soldiers had no clearly distinguishable military targets. Instead, hostile belligerents were difficult to identify. Hostile Somali clansmen wore no uniforms and were hard to distinguish from noncombatants. To make matters worse, Somali civilians carried weapons openly to protect themselves against thieves and rival factions. Some Somali civilians, paid by private relief organizations as security guards, were authorized by US and UN officials to carry weapons. These armed Somalis further confused identification between friendly and enemy people. Soldiers could not merely shoot armed Somalis on sight without risking killing a friendly Somali. Exacerbating the problem of fighting a nonuniformed enemy, most engagements between soldiers and Somalis occurred at night, at close range, and in the immediate vicinity of noncombatants. Still further, Somali militiamen typically used civilians as cover from direct fire.⁶⁷ Yet, within the first thirty days of Restore Hope, the light fighters were challenged with unarmed but hostile civilians.

In the midst of planning a company air assault mission to secure the small town of Merca along the coast, Major Martin Stanton, the battalion S-3 for 2-87 IN, was tasked to secure an International Red Cross warehouse that was being looted by local civilians. With the infantry reaction platoon and the antitank platoon, Major Stanton arrived at

Wanwaylen to find total mayhem. Hundreds of people were fighting each other over bags of rice. In order to gain control of the situation, Stanton ordered the troops to advance with bayonets while yelling at the top of their lungs. Once the force gained control of the warehouse, Stanton decided to hand out the food in an orderly manner. Stanton's thought was, once the unit passed out the food, the people would disperse and the disturbance would be over. Unfortunately, Stanton at the time did not understand one of the economic realities of Somali - relief supplies were money. The platoon struggled to keep the rioting Somalis at bay while this "free money" was being handed out. Warning shots only provided short-lived relief to the ever growing pressure. At one point, Stanton apprehended an instigator and planned to shoot him in front of the crowd when the battalion commander suddenly arrived with reinforcements. Finally at 2045 hours and under the illumination provided by the battalion mortar platoon, the force withdrew leaving the last bags of rice for the Somalis to fight over.⁶⁸

Stanton listed three lessons learned in the incident. First, the major felt he should have never let himself get involved. Knowing what he learned about rioting Somalis, the force he had with him was inadequate for such a task. Second, he assumed the crowd would remain nonviolent once under control. Given the right catalyst, he found a peaceful crowd could swiftly become a rock-throwing mob. Lastly, he felt if he had gathered the tribal leaders together and handed out the food to them, it would have put the onus of protecting their share of the food back on the Somalis.⁶⁹ Having the tribal leaders receive an equal share of the food could have evoked a conflict between the tribes and perhaps caused further violence. Not knowing the population and capabilities of the different tribes, an equal portions for each tribe could have been perceived as unfair in the Somalis

minds. Smaller tribes may have received more than their intended share. Yet, the idea of getting the Somali tribal leaders involved in the distribution process may have assisted in controlling the crowd and appears to be a step in the right direction. In any case, the situation was definitely alien to these soldiers and perplexing to the leadership. Other significant operations involved the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry in Kismayu and Mogadishu.

When a Somali warlord had organized an attack on the city of Kismayu, the Belgium battalion there requested assistance. The UN headquarters deployed the 1-22 IN over 200 miles from Mogadishu to Kismayu by C-130, UH-60 and five-ton trucks. At the time, 1-22 IN was acting as the UN QRF.⁷⁰ The battalion conducted search and attack missions immediately outside the city to locate and apprehend any militiamen who might be contemplating another assault. Although the operation ended without any contact, the Belgium battalion was soon tasked to conduct security operations in an area north of the city, leaving 1-22 IN with the security of the NGOs and to ensure continued stability in the streets of Kismayu. During this ten day operation, the soldiers conducted cordon and search missions, street patrols, roadblocks, checkpoints, and civil disturbance control in a very unfamiliar urban environment. Such tasks required a high degree of flexibility and discipline among the soldiers.⁷¹

The other significant mission that the 1-22 IN participated involved supporting a Pakistan Battalion attack on a warlord's headquarters which stored unauthorized weapons in Mogadishu. The battalion soon realized operating in a complex MOUT environment with a coalition force was very difficult. The Pakistanis did not share their tactics nor their language. During this operation, 1-22 IN executed a cordon and search, patrolled the streets, and set up checkpoints and roadblocks, all the while having to react to snipers and

clearing pockets of resistance. After analyzing these two operations and to better prepare their soldiers for further likely missions, the commander revised his METL to incorporate the following: conduct a cordon and search, assault a built-up area, conduct air assault, establish roadblock/checkpoint, reconnoiter, conduct movement to contact/hasty attack, and conduct convoy operations. During the battalion's down time, companies rotated to training areas to train on these new tasks.⁷²

The most significant operation that the 10th Mountain Division soldiers participated in was the rescue of the downed rangers that occurred on 3 October 1993. In early August 1993, the 2-14 IN assumed the UN QRF mission from 1-22 IN. In preparation for their possible missions, the battalion conducted close quarter battle live fire exercises at an old Soviet military base on the outskirts of Mogadishu.⁷³ This training would soon be tested.

Supported by four Pakistani T-55 tanks, the battalion's plan for the rescue of the encircled rangers called for two companies to ride mounted on Malaysian APCs, and attack mounted for as far as possible until they could break through to the rangers. The extraction operation began at 2145 hours on 3 October. By 0030 hours on 4 October, the battalion had linked up with the rangers. The small arms fire and rocket fire encountered along the way caused the movement to be slow. By early the next morning, with the support of helicopter gunships providing rocket fire into the nearby enemy held buildings, the battalion was able to extract the badly beaten ranger group. Including the rangers, the battalion had eighteen soldiers killed and seventy-seven wounded.⁷⁴ For the soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, Somali provided a classic case in which they were challenged across the entire spectrum of conflict.

Initially, these units in Somali found that conducting the more traditional, yet dangerous tasks, such as destroying militia arms caches and air assault raids, were easier than conducting crowd control and checkpoint operations. Units trained for war found it more difficult to operate in an environment that required the employment of nonlethal means and graduated response. Highlighting the disparity between the 10th Mountain Division's training focus on traditional tasks at Ft. Drum and the restrictive ROE requirements in Somali, a battalion operations officer said, "effective methods of defense short of deadly force were practically nonexistent."⁷⁵

Early in the operation, soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division were not equipped with nonlethal methods or means. As a result of this deficiency, soldiers improvised, as they always do, and began carrying sticks and tent pegs in order to protect themselves from nonlethal threats. Eventually, soldiers were issued batons and pepper spray to fend off nondeadly acts of aggression.⁷⁶ It became obvious that traditional warfighting training did not provide the methods needed to confront this OOTW environment. Recognizing this need for change, units shifted their training focus while in Somali to meet these OOTW type tasks. Both 1-22 IN and 2-14 IN developed training scenarios that called for the use of graduated response and the proportional use of force. The training was designed to evaluate the soldiers understanding of the ROE. By incorporating hostile and nonhostile civilians into patrolling, checkpoint, and cordon and search training operations, leaders and soldiers were challenged to exercise good judgment and independent action.⁷⁷ In each scenario, commanders focused on insuring the soldiers understood the importance of force protection and the four "Nos". The ROE listed four basic "Nos", no technicals,

such as vehicles with mounted machine guns, no banditry, no militia roadblocks, and no armed bandits.⁷⁸

The US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences conducted interviews with over five hundred participants who participated in operations in Somalia. The survey revealed some interesting insights. When asked whether respondents would volunteer for another mission like Somali, sixty-one percent said no. Most common reasons given were the mission was not in defense of family or country, combat troops should perform combat missions only, they did not feel needed, US soldiers should not get involved in another country's civil war, and the most common response dealt with family separation. The most frequent written comment addressed the lack of a clearly defined mission. Comments such as, "It was a shooting humanitarian mission" and "It was a learn as you go experience." The next most frequent comment dealt with the nature of the mission. Comments such as, "All Somali was politics" and "We fought for nothing."

Soldiers were not hesitant to voice their displeasure about the operations ROE and their next most frequent comments in the survey addressed this topic. Statements included: "Inability to return fire was upsetting," "Rules were too strict," "We felt our hands were tied," and "ROE should be in favor of peacekeepers."⁷⁹ Nearly all these comments suggest the soldiers did not understand the environment in which they were required to serve. Operating under restrictive ROE is not new to Army operations. To say that an operation is nothing but politics exemplifies the lack of understanding of how the US exercises its military power. In order to lift this confusion from their minds, soldiers should be told why their sacrifices are required from a national perspective. Given that OOTW operations are primarily decentralized and ambiguous, relating the soldiers

mission to an overall national strategy allows him to act within the intent of US policy. Inappropriate use of force by a group of soldiers on a check point can quickly dampen US intentions during an OOTW operation. When one considers the abundant domestic and international press historically present in OOTW, a soldier's understanding of not only the ROE but his mission is often critical for success. Clearly, the traditional training, in which the 10th Mountain Division soldiers were trained, did not provide this cognitive understanding. These fundamental impressions will never change in our soldiers minds unless the Army exposes these soldiers to real world contingency type operations. Within twenty-four months, political instability in the small Caribbean country of Haiti soon required the 10th soldiers to deploy once again. On this occasion, the soldiers were better prepared for the OOTW tasks that lay ahead.

E. Operations in Haiti

The events leading to the intervention of US forces in Haiti on 19 September 1994 are part of Haiti's turbulent political history which is characterized by military coups and popular uprisings. When high unemployment, poor living conditions, and the lack of political freedom spawned massive popular protest in 1986, Jean-Claude Duvalier was forced to flee the country. His twenty-nine year dictatorship suddenly ended. As Duvalier sought exile in France, two failed military coups resulted in an interim government led by Supreme Court Justice Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, who established Haiti's first free elections in 1990. On 12 December 1990, the leftist Roman Catholic Priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide won the election in a landslide collecting 68% of the popular vote.⁸⁰

On 30 September 1991, LTG Raul Cedras, the commander in chief of the Haitian army, successfully organized a coup and unseated Aristide. The Cedras regime's brutal suppression of the population caused thousands of Haitians to flee their country by boat. After months of diplomatic negotiations, Aristide and Cedras signed a 10-point accord on 3 July 1993 that called for Cedras to step down on 15 October 1993. A month after the accord was signed, Aristide named Robert Malval as interim prime minister to prepare the way for his return. Cedras failed to honor his agreement, and two months later Malval resigned amidst threats to his life. UN and US economic sanctions began once again, causing the already poverty stricken Haitians to leave the country by the thousands in small boats bound for the Florida coast.⁸¹

Finally on 31 July 1994, the UN approved Resolution 940 under chapter VII of the UN charter authorizing the US to use "all necessary means" to reestablish democracy in Haiti.⁸² All peaceful resolutions up to this point failed. In a last ditched effort to avoid military confrontation, President Clinton, on 17 September 1994, sent a delegation headed by former President Jimmy Carter to discuss how and when the junta will resign and whether US forces can land peacefully.⁸³

On 29 July 1994, the 10th Mountain Division was notified that they will possibly participate in military operations in Haiti. Immediately, the Commanding General changed the training focus for the division. The Commander's Training Guidance directed the division to train on the following battle tasks: convoy and convoy security, security of NGOs/PVOs, cordon and search, security of US embassy, NEO operations, air assault training, strike force operations, port security operations, MOUT, and ROE training.⁸⁴ The brigades quickly consolidated their training resources and established three situation

training lanes, one for each battalion.⁸⁵ Lane one covered defense of a fixed site, platoon quick reaction force training, platoon static security point training, platoon hasty road block, refugee control, and handling of detainees. Lane two was a company raid LFX, where one platoon conducted a raid while the other two platoons occupied blocking positions or ambush sites. Lane two also addressed convoy escort, react to ambush LFX, and air assault search and attack. Lane three covered MOUT operations and civil disturbance training. ROE training was integrated into all STX lanes.⁸⁶

In changing their training focus, the 10th Mountain Division was attempting to prepare their soldiers for tasks that differed from their traditional training regiment. Such an alteration infers that the leadership realized that traditional training practices would not fully prepare soldiers for their likely missions in Haiti.⁸⁷ As events unfolded, the leadership was correct. On 18 September, former President Carter informed President Clinton that an agreement with the junta had been reached which allowed the peaceful landing of US forces.

Small unit operations in Haiti had little resemblance to conventional light forces tasks. Cordon and search, civil disturbance, fixed site security, and the security/presence patrols were the most frequently conducted missions in Haiti. Cordon and search missions were often conducted in order to capture suspected hostile personnel and weapons caches. Crowd control operations were in constant use around US held facilities, where large crowds would often gather. In order to maintain access to many of these facilities, it was essential for the infantry force to effectively control large demonstrations. In both cases, graduated responses to violent acts by leaders and soldiers were exercised. The ability of

the infantrymen not to overreact and to quickly analyze the situation prevented the unnecessary loss of life and secured mission success.⁸⁸

Despite the lack of traditional combat operations conducted by the 10th Mountain Division in their predeployment training, all three Haiti CALL lessons learned volumes reported that training units for war produces units fully capable of conducting OOTW. When one examines the division's predeployment training, it is clear that the focus on OOTW skills was the critical ingredient for success. If, in fact, training units for war only produced units able to successfully conduct OOTW, then why did the Commanding General change the division's training focus when notified of possible operations in Haiti. The general made this change knowing that the overwhelming use of force, as practiced during traditional training, would not mentally prepare his soldiers for the restraints they were about to encounter. The CALL conclusion is based in part on the observation that the division's predeployment training contained traditional combat missions, such as raids. These types of missions were in preparation for the forcible entry option into Haiti. Yet, understanding that the fighting would eventually cease in a forcible entry operation and drawing on their Somali experiences, the division keenly balanced their training to cover both environments. This diversity in their preparation proved fruitful.

In one incident, a platoon conducting a night patrol in the vicinity of a Port-au-Prince police station happened upon an armed guard. Startled by the US platoon, the guard raised his weapon. The platoon leader immediately employed his linguist and used hand jesters to calm the guard, which averted unnecessary harm to both the guard and his soldiers. Although the use of deadly force would have been authorized in this case, the lieutenant fully understood the intent of the ROE and his overall purpose in Haiti. His

actions prevented what could have been perceived as an inappropriate use of force.⁸⁹ An understanding of the principle of restraint was not only demonstrated by the leadership, but entire units displayed their understanding of the ROE.

On 2 October in Cap Haitien, an infantry battalion's quick reaction platoon was called out when a crowd was reported to be harassing a Haitian Army soldier. The report indicated that the soldier was barricaded in his home and armed. Upon arrival, the platoon quickly isolated the home and controlled the crowd. After an interpreter communicated to the soldier the overwhelming firepower surrounding his home, the soldier still refused to surrender. The platoon did not try to forcibly take the soldier, but instead waited while maintaining control of the crowd and reassuring the soldier that he would not be harmed. Realizing the sincerity and professionalism of the men surrounding his home, the soldier eventually relinquished his weapon and surrendered to the platoon leader.⁹⁰ In this and many other situations in Haiti, the soldiers demonstrated that the use of ROE in their training had provided them with a mature understanding of the principle of restraint which went beyond the mere memorization of the ROE.

Many leaders in the 10th Mountain Division agreed that the OOTW tasks they trained on prepared them well for their mission in Haiti. An infantry platoon leader concluded that the predeployment OOTW training gave his soldiers a "thorough grounding of what they could expect in Haiti."⁹¹ A Command Sergeant Major, corroborating the lieutenant's assessment, commented that the OOTW training was "essential to accomplishing the mission in Haiti."⁹² The adoption of OOTW tasks in their predeployment training by the Division Commander prior to the mission exemplifies the inability of traditional training to fully meet the requirements of OOTW. Future

operations may not provide these forces with the time to actively prepare for such operations. If the Army is committed to train their soldiers for the complete spectrum of conflict, then the training doctrine that drives the Army's daily activities should include OOTW tasks.

*"We will not have room for specialist. We must develop a team that plays both ways, a team that is scrappy and willing to perform many missions, a team that is versatile and agile."*⁹³

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr.

III. Comparison and Analysis of Light Forces Training Doctrine with Historical and Future Employment

FM 25-100, Training the Force, states, "The Army has an obligation to the American people to ensure its sons and daughters go into battle with the best chance for success and survival."⁹⁴ Training is the means in which the Army fulfills this obligation. For the last fifty years the "battle" has been focused on the traditional tasks envisioned in fighting a Cold War scenario. With the recent operations in Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti, OOTW has surged to the forefront of current operations. However, the Army's training regimes continually paid little attention to this emerging phenomenon. A unit's training is based on a mission essential tasks list, METL, that is derived from their wartime mission and the higher commander's guidance. For light forces, the monograph's historical perspective has illustrated that their operational missions have spanned the entire conflict spectrum. However, the infantry training doctrine that supports light forces training fails to include much of the OOTW tasks that are conducted at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Subsequently, light force evaluation standards fails to capture the complete "battle" environment in which the soldiers are expected to serve.

The Army training and evaluation program (ARTEP) for light forces is outlined in mission training plans (MTP). For example, ARTEP 7-20-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Battalion, contains training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) which

provides the commander with tasks, conditions, standards and performance measures that are needed to train on critical missions. Each T&EO can be part of one or more critical mission. Used in various combination, T&EOs provide performance measures and tasks that are used to formulate external evaluations, field training exercises, and situational training exercises. The specific details for the training program hinges primarily on the unit's METL. Other considerations include the commanders guidance and directives, resource availability, and sub-unit training proficiencies. The METL is derived from the units wartime mission. With this understanding of Army training doctrine, the monograph will examine some light forces METLs to evaluate whether they delve into the OOTW environment.

Current and past light forces battalion METLs are provided in appendix 2. In reviewing all these light forces battalion METLS, only one, the 82nd 's last METL, includes an OOTW task, conduct NEO. This suggests that, despite the thirty year history of light forces involvement in OOTW, current light forces battalions continue to train on traditional tasks. One reason for such a narrow focus can be attributed to the lack of OOTW tasks in infantry doctrine manuals.

Published in November 1993, ARTEP 7-8-Drill, Battle Drills for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, provides light force small unit leaders with their first collective training requirements. The manual states, "A battle drill is a collective action executed by a platoon of smaller element without applying a *deliberate* decision-making process."⁹⁵ The benefit to training on such tasks minimizes the need for leaders' orders while allowing the soldier to master his individual skills in an instinctive manner. Unfortunately, the drill manual states all drills be conducted with maximum violence. In such a restrained

environment as OOTW, these instinctive reactions by soldiers may be inappropriate. By ignoring the requirement to train under a restrictive fire environment, light force leaders require their soldiers in an OOTW environment to use whatever initiative and innovation they can muster. ARTEP 7-8-Drill is designed to support the collective tasks in ARTEP 7-8-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. Yet, when one surveys the 1994 ARTEP 7-8-MTP, a different perspective appears.

The conditions under which all tasks in ARTEP 7-8-MTP can be evaluated mention that "US forces comply with the ROE. Collateral damage is limited"⁹⁶ The manual further mentions the presence of civilians, government organizations, NGOs, PVOs, and the international press on the battlefield.⁹⁷ These realistic conditions are new to the present squad, platoon, and company MTPs. The previous 1988 version of these MTPs made no mention of ROE or of these different organizations on the battlefield.⁹⁸ Yet, the performance measures in such tasks as clear a building still call for blowing an entrance through a wall and cooking off hand grenades prior to throwing them through windows and doors.⁹⁹ Of all the tasks in ARTEP 7-8-MTP, only the tasks, establish a roadblock/checkpoint and process enemy prisoners of war/captured material, contain performance measures that include nonlethal means and are applicable to OOTW.¹⁰⁰ All other performance measures fail to mention nonlethal or alternative measures that would be appropriate in a restrictive environment. This lack of alternative methods can also be found absent in the infantry company evaluation manual, ARTEP 7-10-MTP. The current battalion evaluation manual, ARTEP 7-20-MTP, published in 1988 is much like the earlier platoon and squad evaluation manual and does not reference the exercise of ROE or collateral damage.¹⁰¹ Although attacks and raids, both OOTW tasks, are covered, the

performance measures associated with these tasks are not in any way restrictive as they would be if conducted under OOTW conditions. Clearly, this battalion manual needs to at least mirror its subordinate evaluation manuals. Another possible reason for this lack of constraint in training doctrine lies in the distinct separation of the two subjects.

The Army's doctrinal manuals separate OOTW from traditional combat tasks. This distinction stems from the Army's philosophy that units should train primarily for war. For example, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, and FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, are manuals that address OOTW tasks separately from wartime tasks. Additionally, FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, and FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, both place low intensity conflict in the appendix portion of the field manuals. The Army's distinction of these tasks fails to capture the fluidity of operations that actually occur during contingency operations.

The 82nd Airborne Division deployments to the Dominican Republic and in Panama began with violence but quickly transitioned to peacekeeping. For the 4-17th IN of the 7th Infantry Division in Panama, their deployment began as a peacekeeping mission, transition to combat, then ended as a peacekeeping mission. Units from the 10th Mountain Division were sent to Somalia to secure a humanitarian mission but found themselves reacting to violence on a regular basis. Conversely, other deployments consisted of exercising the threat of violence, such as the 10th Mountain Division peacekeeping mission in Haiti and the 3-325 ABCT's mission in northern Iraq.¹⁰² If the Army continues to separate the two types of operations, then the infantry training evaluation manuals will continue to lack the completeness required to prepare light forces for tasks performed during OOTW. Much

of this discontinuity in training evaluation is attributed to the evaluation standards practiced at the Joint Operations Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Polk, Louisiana.

The light forces training missions at JRTC primarily focus on traditional missions. A review of the previous years JRTCs training rotations reveals that the light forces are primarily being evaluated on movement to contact, attack, defend, and search and attack missions. Only one rotation involving the 10th Mountain Division utilized military forces to protect a civilian population. Additionally, no type of restrictive ROE was exercised during most of these rotations.¹⁰³ Over the last two years, the Army has begun to exclusively dedicate one JRTC rotation each year to OOTW. Only two such rotations have occurred, one dealt with peacekeeping and the other with peace enforcement. The peacekeeping rotation featured the two belligerent forces already separated while the peace enforcement rotation required the US force to separate the two belligerents. In each case, the two belligerent forces were vying for political power. The training included actual GOs, NGOs, PVOs, civilians, and press organizations.¹⁰⁴ Training on these OOTW activities suggests that the Army is now beginning to accept these missions as possible contingencies.

Recently, the Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer released Army Vision 2010, a conceptual template for how the Army will channel its training, technology, and people for the challenging environment of the twenty first century. The Army Vision 2010 document listed as its second priority, after fighting and winning the nation's wars, "providing a range of military operations short of war."¹⁰⁵ It further states, "The Army is the force that protects and controls populations, restores order and facilitates the transition from hostilities to peace."¹⁰⁶ Unless the infantry training doctrine reflects these

ideas, the majority of light force units will continue to focus on traditional missions and deny leaders and soldiers preparation for likely missions in an OOTW environment.

*"Lessons are only truly learned when we incorporate them into our planning, doctrine, tactics, and training - a process which can take some time."*¹⁰⁷

Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke
President, National Defense University

IV. Conclusions

The monograph's historical survey of light forces deployments has demonstrated a need for training in OOTW tasks. Traditional combat operations either diminish to OOTW tasks or during an OOTW mission combat tasks emerge. The restraints placed on the soldiers by the ROE and collateral damage concerns were unfamiliar to most soldiers but are quickly becoming the norm. In the last thirty years, soldiers unfamiliarity in the OOTW environment have voiced their options. The paratroopers operating in the Dominican Republic were forced to refrain from returning sniper fire, Just Cause quickly transitioned to stability operations, and Restore Hope possessed a combination of both OOTW and combat operations. These experiences appear to bring change to infantry training doctrine.

Infantry training doctrine has begun to incorporate OOTW considerations into the conditions of infantry ARTEP manuals. Many of the OOTW tasks are still absent from these manuals. Although there are shared tasks between war and OOTW, the need for restraint fundamentally changes the way units operate. The training manuals lack the performance measures in which soldiers are expected to operate under OOTW conditions. The largest discrepancy is revealed in the MOUT tasks, where no passive measures are presented. Further, manuals that do cover OOTW missions are separate and distinct from traditional combat manuals. FM 100-5 and TRADOC Pam 525-5 state the requirement

for our Army to be versatile, however, the performance standards in infantry training evaluation manuals have not captured this concept. This separation in the written doctrine gives the impression that the two operations occur separately, when in fact, the monographs historical examples show that they can occur one after the other or simultaneously. Examples are Just Cause, Urgent Fury, and Restore Hope. External evaluations of light forces that focus on traditional missions tend to reinforce this separation.

Rotations at JRTC are beginning to include peacekeeping and peace enforcement type scenarios. This new movement toward OOTW missions indicates the Army realizes that these missions are likely to require their participation. The entire dedication of a JRTC rotation to solely OOTW activities still fails to capture the fluid environment in which forces are deployed. Separating these activities may not be providing the soldier with the ambiguous environment in which it is the most difficult to operate in. Merging both OOTW and traditional tasks will develop the mental flexibility to distinguish the important from the unimportant and provide the ability to exercise initiative sooner.

Additionally, there seems to be a discrepancy to what leaders feel about OOTW and what soldiers experience. Officers write about soldiers that are trained for war are flexible enough to handle OOTW tasks. Yet, soldiers express frustration and concern when placed in these OOTW missions.

Until the OOTW tasks are included in the training manuals, leaders will continue to focus precious training time and resources on only traditional wartime tasks. Such narrow concentration in training will further cloud the soldiers mind when deployed in OOTW. General Gordon R. Sullivan, the previous Army Chief of Staff once said, "Rather than a

single, focused threat, America's twenty-first century Army faces a broad range of challenges."¹⁰⁸ In order to meet this threat, the following recommendations are offered.

Doctrinal manuals, at all echelons, should include OOTW tasks for several reasons. First, and foremost, the inclusion of OOTW tasks in infantry training manuals would signify that the infantry community has embodied the need to train at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. By doing so, the infantry community would be supporting the Army's base doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, which clearly states that OOTW is an environment that the Army is expected to operate. In fact, the historical examples have shown light forces are likely to be the predominant choice for OOTW missions.

Second, by placing OOTW tasks in training manuals, leaders and soldiers will realize that their responsibilities on the battlefield go beyond destroying the enemy. Combat soldiers can and will be used in situations other than all out combat. The mental flexibility developed from such training will decrease hesitation from acting in an unfamiliar environment while fostering soldier initiative.

Third, the light force battalions would have a mission-based training standard to which they could train. These training and evaluation plans would allow commanders to determine readiness in OOTW tasks and allow battalions to adjust their METLs to meet likely contingencies. Without the presence of OOTW tasks in MTPs, units will likely continue to neglect training in this area.

Finally, units alerted for an OOTW mission would have a readily available reference for conducting realistic and effective training. This benefit would allow the alerted units leadership to devote its time on predeployment planning instead of exhausting themselves attempting to develop an ad hoc training program. Although no two OOTW

missions are the same, the principles practiced and inherent restraints involved provide a solid foundation in which leaders and soldiers can act confidently. Scenarios from recent and historical records could be used to develop these training evaluation standards.

In a recent monograph, Major Brian Barham demonstrates how the cordon and search task, developed with conditions and standards for both the friendly and enemy force, can prepare an infantry battalion for the challenges during an OOTW mission. His monograph established the cordon and search task into an ARTEP format, complete with performance measures and sub-unit tasks. By referencing historical cases, he was able to create creditable tasks, conditions and standards.¹⁰⁹ This type of effort can and should be replicated with similar tasks such as enforce movement restrictions, identify and process detainees, disarm belligerents, evaluate civilian infrastructure, and defend a convoy. These tasks are but a few that would broaden the training doctrine made available to light forces.

CALL has conducted extensive work over the last six years to capture the lessons learned during Operations Just Cause, Restore Hope, and Restore Democracy. For Operation Restore Democracy alone, CALL has produced three large volumes. A recent CALL publication, ROE Training, An Alternative Approach, provides leaders in an OOTW environment with performance measures that assist trainers to teach soldiers how to determine the appropriate use of force. Several excellent case studies are presented that require soldiers to exercise ROE under difficult circumstances.¹¹⁰ These and other publications could and should be used to update the squad and platoon battle drill manual.

With the inclusion of ROE performance measures, soldiers may better understand their responsibilities during OOTW missions and avoid the frustrations experienced by the

10th Mountain Division soldiers in Somalia. "ROEs are not only a life and death decision but also critical elements in determining the success or failure of peace operations."¹¹¹

In order to support such training, the Army must determine what nonlethal weapons units will be authorized to employ during OOTW.

In a recent article in *Parameters*, LTC Martin Stanton cautions the Army from jumping on the band wagon of developing new nonlethal weapons. He states that the Army already possesses nonlethal weapons such as tear gas, pepper spray, water cannons, and rubber bullets. Units need only to train with these current means in order to appreciate their effectiveness. He stresses that the Army must not put our soldiers in a position of "bringing a club to a gun fight" in order to appease the press. Clear military goals and objectives along with the will to carry them out is essential. Yet, without some training with these nonlethal measures, the Army may undercut political aims if inappropriate force is used.¹¹²

Lastly, the Army can increase its understanding of operating in the full spectrum of conflict by establishing OOTW missions at the beginning or end of JRTC rotations. Letting a situation de-escalate into a peacekeeping/peace enforcement scenario or allowing it to escalate from peacekeeping/peace enforcement to a full combat scenario would expose light forces to the dynamic environments in which they are likely to deploy. These scenarios would reinforce the fact that every unit assigned a OOTW mission must still be able to fight on a moments notice. By providing leaders and soldiers with tough ROEs and challenging them with realistic ambiguous situations in training where decisions have to be made about the use of force, units could develop extraordinary mental flexibility.

Finally, the decision to train on OOTW tasks or war should not be the question light forces leaders ask themselves. Realizing the tumultuous environments their soldiers will be asked to serve, the leadership must determine a balance between OOTW and traditional tasks in their training priorities. Given the limited training resources available to the Army today, light leaders should select tasks that embody the full spectrum of conflict. Soldiers should be trained not only on the principles of combat but also on the difficulties of OOTW.

APPENDIX 1: FM 100-5 Operations, OOTW "Activities"

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Arms Control

Support to Domestic Civil Authorities

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Security Assistance

Nation Assistance

Support to Counter Drug Operations

Combating Terrorism

Peacekeeping Operations

Peace Enforcement Operations

Show of Force

Support for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Attacks and Raids

APPENDIX 2: Current and Past Light Forces Battalion Mission Essential Task Lists

82nd Airborne Division Infantry Battalion METL.

- 1) Execute Readiness Standing Operating Procedures (RSOP).
- 2) Conduct Airborne Assault to Secure an Airfield.
- 3) Defend.
- 4) Attack.
- 5) Perform Movement to Contact.
- 6) Perform Combat Service Support Operations.
- 7) Command and Control the Battalion.
- 8) Perform Air Assault.
- 9) Conduct Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).¹¹³

10th Mountain Division METL.

- 1) Execute RSOP.
- 2) Conduct Movement to Contact.
- 3) Conduct Attack.
- 4) Conduct Attack of a Built-Up Area.
- 5) Conduct Infiltration.
- 6) Conduct Defense.
- 7) Conduct Defense of a Built-Up Area.
- 8) Perform Air Assault.
- 9) Conduct Force Protection.¹¹⁴

APPENDIX 2: Current and Past Light Forces Battalion Mission Essential Task Lists
(Continued)

101st Air Assault Division METL.

- 1) Alert, Assemble, Upload and Deploy by Air, Rail, Ground or Sea.
- 2) Command and Control the Battalion.
- 3) Perform Air Assault.
- 4) Perform Assault.
- 5) Defend.
- 6) Perform Combat Support Operations.
- 7) Perform Combat and Service Support Operations.
- 8) Conduct Force Protection Operations.¹¹⁵

7th Infantry Division (Light) METL.

- 1) Execute RSOP.
- 2) Occupy Assembly Area.
- 3) Conduct Passage of Lines.
- 4) Conduct Infiltration/Exfiltration.
- 5) Fight a Meeting Engagement
- 6) Assault.
- 7) Conduct Air Assault.
- 8) Attack a Built-Up Area.
- 9) Conduct Link Up Operations.
- 10) Conduct Relief in Place Operations.

**APPENDIX 2: Current and Past Light Forces Battalion Mission Essential Task Lists
(Continued)**

11) Defend.

12) Move Tactically.

13) Conduct Stay Behind Operations.

14) Establish Lodgment.¹¹⁶

ENDNOTES

¹ U. S. Army, FM 25-100, Training the Force, (Washington D. C., Headquarters Department of the Army, 1988), p. 1-1.

² Martin N. Stanton, "A Riot in Wanwaylen, Lessons Learned." Army, (December 1994), 24-30.

³ For arguments against specialized OOTW training see Jeffery D. Church, "Letters," Infantry (Mar-Apr 95), 4-5. William J. Martinez, "Peace Operations," Infantry, (May-June 94), 39-40. And Sean Naylor, "Will Soldiers Become Flabby Do-Gooders," Army Times, (Oct 11, 93), 13 and "Well Done but Warlike It's Not," Army Times, (Jul 3, 93), 10.

⁴ Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), "Operations Other Than War, Peace Operations Volume IV," Newsletter 93-8, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 1993), V-4.

⁵ For views in favor of OOTW training see, John P. Abizaid, "Lessons for Peacekeepers," Military Review (Mar 1993), 11-19. Kjeld G. H. Hillingslo, Peace Support Operations and Training, A Danish Perspective," Peace Support Operations and the US Military, Dennis J. Quinn (Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1994). John B. Hunt, "Hostilities Short of War," Military Review, (March 1993), 41-50. F.M. Lorenz, "Confronting Thievery in Somalia," Military Review, (August 1994), 44-55. F.M. Lorenz, "Less Lethal Force in Operation United Shield," Marine Corps Gazette, (September 1995), 68-76. Patrick D. McGowan, "Operations in Somalia, Changing the Light Infantry Training Focus," Infantry, (Nov-Dec 1993), 23-25.

⁶ See Hunt, Lorenz, and McGowan.

⁷ Katherine A. Brittin, "Specialized Military Training for Peace Operations," Program Evaluation for The Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Arlington, VA), 49.

⁸ See John P. Abizaid, "Lessons for Peacekeepers," Military Review (Mar 1993), 11-19. And Patrick D. McGowan, "Operations in Somalia, Changing the Light Infantry Training Focus," Infantry, (Nov-Dec 1993), 23-25.

⁹ US Army, "Force XXI Operations," Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, (Washington DC, Headquarters Department of the Army, 1994), 1-1.

¹⁰ U. S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington D. C., Headquarters Department of the Army, 1993), p. 2-9.

¹¹ Ibid.

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- ¹² See Chapter 2 of FM 100-5 for explanation of the range of military operations that the Army is expected to operate.
- ¹³ See p. 2-22 of FM 100-5 for an explanation of the different types of infantry units and their purposes.
- ¹⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.
- ¹⁵ Richard K. Kolb, "Packing Power in Santo Domingo," Veterans of Foreign Wars, (February 1992), 26.
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Lawrence A. Yates, POWER PACK, US Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, (Ft. Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 59-71.
- ¹⁸ Ibid, p.69.
- ¹⁹ Ibid, p.70.
- ²⁰ Abraham Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 120.
- ²¹ Yates, p.79.
- ²² Ibid, p.122.
- ²³ Ibid. p.119.
- ²⁴ Bruce C. Palmer Jr., "Contingency Operations, Dominican Republic," Army, (November 1965), 26.
- ²⁵ Bruce Palmer, Jr., Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965, (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1989), p.52.
- ²⁶ Yates, p.119.
- ²⁷ Ibid, p.101.
- ²⁸ See Yates chapter 7 for difficulties soldiers faced while operating in Santo Domingo.
- ²⁹ Kolb, p.28.

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- ³⁰ Yates, pp.123-124.
- ³¹ Kolb, p.28.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ Yates, p.140.
- ³⁴ Robert F. Barry, ed. Power Pack, (Portsmouth, VA, Messenger Printing Company, 1965) 28.
- ³⁵ Yates, p.177.
- ³⁶ Joseph P. Doty, Urgent Fury - A Look Back - A Look Forward, (Newport, RI, Naval War College, Student Paper, 1994), 10.
- ³⁷ Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury, The Battle for Grenada, (Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1989), 107-108.
- ³⁸ Joseph Metcalf III, "Decision Making and the Grenada Rescue Operation." James G. March and Roger Weissinger-Baylon, ed., Ambiguity and Command, Organizational Perspective for Military Decision Making, (Marchfield, MA, Pitman, 1986), 281.
- ³⁹ DRF 1 is a battalion size unit that is ready to deploy Ft. Bragg within eighteen hours from notification. DRF stands for division ready force. Within the 82nd, each battalion is designated a DRF number which determines the sequence in which the battalions deploy from Ft. Bragg. For example, the first battalion to deploy is designated DRF 1 and the last is designated DRF 9. Each battalion deploys with its complementary forces, such as engineers and air defense units. The emergency deployment readiness exercise or EDRE is the notification process that alerts the units that a deployment has been ordered. The 82nd often conducts EDREs in a training scenario to determine their deployment readiness.
- ⁴⁰ Jack L. Hamilton, Operation Urgent Fury, A Battalion Commander's Perspective, (Washington, DC, National War College, Student Paper, 1985), 9.
- ⁴¹ Ibid, p.17.
- ⁴² Ibid, p.21.
- ⁴³ Ibid, p.24.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid, p.25.
- ⁴⁵ Adkin, p. 339.

⁴⁶ George A. Crocker, Grenada Remembered, A Perspective, A Narrative Essay on Operation Urgent Fury, (Carlisle Barracks, PA, US Army War College, Student Paper, 1987), 15.

⁴⁷ Adkin, p. 308.

⁴⁸ Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause, The Storming of Panama, (New York, NY, Lexington Books, 1991), Ch. 1-5. See also CALL, "Operation Just Cause," Bulletin, No. 90-9 vol. I, (Ft. Leavenworth KS, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1990), I-1. See also Clarence E. Biggs III, Operation Just Cause, A Soldier's Eyewitness Account, (Harrisburg, PA, Stockpole Books, 1990) 8-20.

⁴⁹ Donnelly, p.49.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.50.

⁵¹ CALL Bulletin No. 90-9, p1-1.

⁵² Donnelly, Ch. 5-6.

⁵³ The author commanded C Company, 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry from 16 June 1989 to 20 December 1990 and controlled the company's operation from in front of the Naval Infantry Company Headquarters building during the initial hours of the Just Cause.

⁵⁴ Daniel K. Kirk, 2nd Platoon, C Company, 4-17 Infantry Battalion After-Action Report, December 1989.

⁵⁵ Donnelly, Ch. 11.

⁵⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Soldiers in Panama, Stories of Operation Just Cause, (Washington, DC, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Command Information Pamphlet, 1990), 22-23 and Donnelly, pp. 215-220.

⁵⁷ Ibid, pp.24-25.

⁵⁸ CALL Bulletin No. 90-9, p.I-9.

⁵⁹ Donnelly, p.226.

⁶⁰ Ibid, p.223.

⁶¹ Lorenzo Crowell, "The Anatomy of Just Cause: The Forces Involved, The Adequacy of Intelligence, and Its Success as a Joint Operation," in Operation Just Cause: The US

Intervention in Panama, edited by Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 92-94.

⁶² Steven N. Collins, "Just Cause Up Close: A Light Infantryman's View," Parameters Summer 1992, 55.

⁶³ Ibid, pp.55-65.

⁶⁴ Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995), 13-14.

⁶⁵ Allard, p.15.

⁶⁶ Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War in the 1990's, (Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 282-291.

⁶⁷ Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), III-3,4. And Martin N. Stanton, "Riot Control for the 1990's," Infantry (Jan-Feb 1996), 22-29.

⁶⁸ Martin N. Stanton, "A Riot in Wanwaylan: Lessons Learned," Army (December 1994), 25-28.

⁶⁹ Ibid, pp.29-30.

⁷⁰ The United Nations Quick Reaction Force, UN QRF, was designed to be ready within a moments notice to react to any unexpected violence that may appear to endanger other military or humanitarian operations in the UN theater of operation .

⁷¹ Patrick D. McGowan, "Operations in Somalia: Changing the Light Infantry Training Focus," Infantry (Nov-Dec 1993), 25.

⁷² Ibid, pp.23-25.

⁷³ Charles P. Ferry, "Mogadishu, October 1993: Personal Account of a Rifle Company XO," Infantry (Sept-Oct 1993), 24.

⁷⁴ Ibid, pp.23-31.

⁷⁵ Jonathan T. Dworkan, "Rules of Engagement: Lessons Learned from Restore Hope," Military Review (Sept 1994), 30.

⁷⁶ For information on soldiers improvisation for nonlethal weapon ideas see Lorenze. Pepper spray is a liquid irritant spray dispensed from a small hand held designed to debilitate an attacker without permanent bodily harm.

⁷⁷ For explanation of rules of engagement training and other OOTW tasks that the 10th Mountain Division soldiers trained on see McGowan, Ferry, and Allard.

⁷⁸ Allard, p.36.

⁷⁹ For soldiers comments on operations in Somalia see John Harman, Peacekeeping in Somalia, (Alexander, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Research Report 1163, 1994), 20-25.

⁸⁰ For back ground information on events leading to Operation Uphold Democracy see Marjorie Ann Browne, Report for Congress, Haiti Security Council Resolutions Texts and Votes 1993-1994, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Institute Library of Congress, 1994). Steve Bowman and Mark Sullivan , Report for Congress, Haiti: Chronology of Its Troubled Path Toward Democracy, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Institute Library of Congress, 1994). CALL "Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions," Haiti D-20 to D+40, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994), xi-xx. And CALL, "Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions," Haiti D-20 to D+150, , (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994), ii-xi.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² CALL, Haiti D-20 to D+40, p.xvi.

⁸³ Ibid, p.xvii.

⁸⁴ 10th Mountain Division Slide Presentation and After-Action Report on Compact Disc, Operation Uphold Democracy, Operations in Haiti, August 1994 thru January 1995, (Ft. Eustis: Training and Audiovisual Support Center, 1996).

⁸⁵ A situational training lane focuses the infantry small unit on accomplishing one or more tasks that support the higher headquarters mission essential tasks list. Often this type of training is used to prepare soldiers for an upcoming operations. Here, the leadership attempts to create the environment in which the soldiers are likely to perform these tasks. In preparing for their possible deployment into Haiti, the 10th Mountain Division used this training technique to develop the soldiers understanding of the tasks and environment they expected to operate in.

⁸⁶ CALL, Haiti D-20 to D+40, p.3.

⁸⁷ The 10th Mountain Division After Action Report states that their experience in Somalia proved very beneficial in preparing the division for Haiti. The report states that most of the situational training lanes were developed from their experience from Somalia. See

10th Mountain Division Slide Presentation and After-Action Report on Compact Disc for further details.

⁸⁸ Ibid, p.113.

⁸⁹ Ibid, p.117.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ CALL, "A CSM's View of OOTW in Haiti," News From the Front, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, May-June 1995), 2-10.

⁹² Ibid, p.16.

⁹³ US, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations, (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994), 86.

⁹⁴ FM 25-100, p.1-1.

⁹⁵ US, Headquarters, Department of the Army, ARTEP 7-8-Drill, Battle Drills for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), 1-1.

⁹⁶ US, Headquarters, Department of the Army, ARTEP 7-8-MTP, Rifle Platoon and Squad, (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994), 5-7 thru 5-242.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ US, Headquarters, Department of the Army, ARTEP 7-8-MTP, Rifle Platoon and Squad, (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1988), 5-5 thru 5-167.

⁹⁹ The 1994 version of ARTEP 7-8-MTP, p.5-93.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, pp.5-198 thru 5-201.

¹⁰¹ US, Headquarters, Department of the Army, ARTEP 7-20-MTP, Infantry Battalion, (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1988), 5-8 thru 5-186.

¹⁰² For a historical perspective of 3rd Battalion, 325th Airborne Battalion Combat Team's action in Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq see John P. Abizaid, "Lessons for Peacekeepers," Military Review March 1993, 11-19. The battalion successfully forced Iraqi forces out of northern Iraq with the threat of violence and stern diplomacy.

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- ¹⁰³ The author obtained missions and tasks at the Joint Readiness Training Center from the Excaliber Program, Army Knowledge Network, Joint Readiness Training Center Take Home Packets, Rotations 96-01 to 96-07.
- ¹⁰⁴ The author obtained information about the OOTW rotations at JRTC from Major Blair Tiger, a current Command and General Staff College student.
- ¹⁰⁵ General Dennis J. Reimer, Army Vision 2010, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1996), 2.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.3.
- ¹⁰⁷ Allard, p.xi.
- ¹⁰⁸ US, Headquarters, Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, (Washington, DC: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994), 2-1.
- ¹⁰⁹ Brian D. Barham, "Cordon and Search: An Operation Other Than War Task for the Infantry Battalion," (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1994).
- ¹¹⁰ Center for Army Lessons Learned, ROE Training: An Alternative Approach, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1996).
- ¹¹¹ Allard, p.62.
- ¹¹² Stanton, pp.63-68.
- ¹¹³ The author obtained the current 82nd Airborne Division Infantry Battalion Mission Essential Task List from a telephone conversation with the G-3 Chief of Training, Major Russell on 25 October 1996.
- ¹¹⁴ The author obtained the current 10th Mountain Division Infantry Battalion Mission Essential Task List from a telephone conversation with the G-3 Chief of Training, Major Smith on 25 October 1996.
- ¹¹⁵ The author obtained the current 101st Air Assault Division Infantry Battalion Mission Essential Task List from a telephone conversation with the G-3 Chief of Training, Major Rossi on 25 October 1996.
- ¹¹⁶ The author obtained the 7th Infantry Division Infantry Battalion Mission Essential Task Lists from his historical records recorded while he served in the division from April 1989 to April 1991.

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